Imperialism, Independence, and Modernization:

British and American Development in 1960s Nigeria

Annie Crabill

April 15, 2014

Professor William Hitchcock

Miller Center of Public Affairs Undergraduate Research Award

Introduction

"Nigeria is the most important country in tropical Africa from the standpoint of her potentiality for leadership among the newly independent African countries….Nigerian Government leaders and the Nigerians themselves are presently devoting tremendous energy to the country's social and economic development and in this manner are preparing a firm foundation for leadership in Africa and world affairs."

- Peace Corps Proposal for Nigeria, March 1961

To be blunt, Nigeria did not become the shining example to the world that the author of the above Peace Corps proposal believed it would. Today, the African nation boasts the greatest HIV/AIDS death rate in the world. Life expectancy is around 52 years old. Half of its female population is illiterate.[1]

But in the early 1960s, British and American leaders sought to modernize Nigeria, which was the most populous nation in Africa. They had different ways of going about that mission: the British, the former colonizers, looked to their long-standing relationship with Nigeria and decided to continue development with targeted projects and moderate funding. The American newcomers threw money and men at the country, treating it as it would any other "under-developed" state. The civil war that enveloped Nigeria in 1967 marked an end to these efforts, which were, regardless, far from achieving their goals.

Yet the failures in Nigeria still hold lessons for students of development. American and British development efforts in Nigeria in the 1960s serve to illustrate deep-seated differences in the two countries' approaches to development. Their ideas differed largely because of their own historical narratives. The United States subscribed to an

[1] CIA World Factbook, Nigeria, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html

interpretation of development that fit into its own experience: one based on a belief in natural, inevitable progress. It is telling that W.W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth was the most widely-read work on modernization and development in the U.S. in the early 1960s. Considered the "development Bible," Rostow's book charted a path to modernity that could be universally replicated and infinitely scaled. The stages represent a distinctly Western idea of linear progress. The book was intended to serve as an alternative to a Marxist model – the sub-heading of the book is "A Non-Communist Manifesto" – and it is infused with American values disguised as economic principles. In Chapter Two, for instance, Rostow hails the Protestant work ethic as the perfect framework to guide a nation wishing to become "modern."[2]

The U.S. distinguished its view of development from that of the Soviet Union by insisting it had already passed through these so-called stages. "Where Communists talked of a perfection yet to be realized," Michael Latham writes, "American modernizers claimed they had already reached the promised land."[3] Historians Latham, Odd Arne Westad and H.W. Arndt, among others, argue that not only did the United States believe it had achieved perfection, it viewed its own story of modernization as the *only* story. "The only way of becoming modern," writes Westad, "would be to emulate the American example, to 'liberate' productivity and innovation from 'ancient"…cultures and ideologies. By the twentieth century the only framework of reference for Americans was America – the completion, one may say, of the self-fulfilling prophesy made at the

---

[2] W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 26.
[3] David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, Michael Latham, Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), p. 4.

beginning of the American republic's existence."[4] Inherent in all societies, then, was the capability to be productive and innovative. It was the United States' responsibility to "liberate" that potential, using what Americans saw as an inherently anti-colonial approach.

The British saw their role differently. First, while Americans believed they needed merely to jumpstart the inevitable modernization process in "backward" countries, the British saw the development of their colonies as a conscious effort that yielded otherwise unattainable improvements. Resources and populations were developed; they did not spontaneously develop on their own. The British did not see the latent capacity for self-improvement in their colonial subjects that Americans claimed existed. Secondly, British motivations were more clearly spelled out: they were seeking *mutually productive* partnerships that would benefit both nations. Americans, while certainly interested in Cold War security gains they believed would result from developing these third-world territories, were more vague about what they sought to benefit from their efforts. Finally, while British officials believed Britain to be a near-perfect modern society, they recognized that Britain's developmental trajectory did not necessarily make sense for other nations – a truth that Americans failed (and still often fail) to grasp.

These different approaches intersected in Nigeria starting in the late 1950s. The period between 1959 and 1966 represents a crucial moment: the British were on their way out, but their influence and policies were still at play; the United States was on its way in, led by an enthusiastic President Kennedy armed with new ideas about modernization, development, and the importance of third world allies. Britain had been actively

---

[4] Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 11-12.

developing Nigeria and the rest of its colonies before the start of the twentieth century, long before Kennedy decided the 1960s should be the "Decade of Development," and long before decolonization loomed on the horizon. The British articulated their willingness to undertake "development" in their colonies – as it applied to the improvements of resources and populations – as early as the late nineteenth century. Development was not a last-ditch effort to maintain influence in its inevitable ex-colonies, but rather something Britain had been practicing to ensure the vitality of its Empire. Colonial development became increasingly important in the years leading up to and immediately following the Second World War, when the British believed development would be the key to ensuring a productive, mutually beneficial relationship with its colonies.

When Nigerian independence did arrive in 1960, there was not a clean and sudden break between Britain and its colonies, no "moment" when the former colonizer lost all legitimacy, influence, and superiority. Rather, this decline in British colonial power was gradual. Accordingly, British behavior did not reflect a sudden shift either. The British believed they would remain a crucial actor – if not take the lead– in developing their decolonized territories, and the official policies and individual attitudes of the British in Nigeria during the era of decolonization reflected this confidence.

Right after World War II, Britain re-imagined its role as both a colonial power and a global power. For the latter, Britain believed it would serve as a crucial mediator between its colonies, the United States, and the rest of Europe. In terms of its imperial position, British officials saw themselves as having strategic and productive partnerships with its colonies – the days of brute imperial policemen bullying natives were a thing of

the past. The development work Britain was interested in doing in the colonies represented this important next phase in their colonial empire. Colonial development was essential for both Britain's economic well-being and its international political reputation. The British maintained that the United States refused to understand that Britain was no longer operating like it was the 19th century. The United States' "old prejudices" against colonialism were frustrating, particularly because it led Americans to enthusiastically support any nations struggling to achieve independence – like Nigeria.

After Nigeria achieved self-rule, dynamics changed between the U.S. and Britain. In the 1950s, Britain tried to attract U.S. attention with its development schemes – both to gain investments and to show Americans the benefits of their approach to colonialism. But after 1960, the U.S. began to move quickly on what was previously British territory. John F. Kennedy declared the 1960s the "Decade of Development," created USAID, and deemed Nigeria an excellent country to host a number of pilot development schemes.

Given its past involvement in the region, Britain understandably assumed it would remain the most influential player in the development game. And for a while, it appeared to be at least an equal to the United States. But as the 1960s progressed, British influence in the region began to decline. Americans, acting according to their own conceptions of what "development" entailed, were interested in providing massive amounts of money and men to spur Nigeria along the path to modernity. Nigerians, while never totally warming to Americans' attitudes, were interested in accepting U.S. generosity.

Until a bloody civil war broke out in Nigeria in 1967 and disrupted its relations with the West, British and American voices were active in the conversations about development. The voices sometimes agreed, but often diverged. For the most part, these

British and American disagreements about Nigerian development can be traced back to their different interpretations of and experiences with development.

This paper will argue that while both British and American approaches to development in Nigeria were flawed, American ideas were more misguided than British ones. Beyond normative claims about the shortcomings of early Cold War American development policy, however, this case study reveals the ways that Britain sought to re-position itself in the new global order, the extent to which it relied on its former colonies to secure that new role, and the reasons why Britain ultimately failed to realize its vision.

This paper is divided into three chronological sections: the first looks at British ideas about colonial development and its relationship with Nigeria and Africa more broadly; the second focuses on the years surrounding independence and explores American development ideology; the third features a comparison between American and British technical assistance efforts in 1960s Nigeria. In my conclusion, I examine the 1960s as a period of gradual British decline. In each of those, I aim to not only highlight key differences between American and British policies, but also explore the relationship between these policies and the relative influence of their prescribers. This paper does not aim to serve as an exhaustive survey of all British and American development undertaken in Nigeria, but rather to provide a close look at several key projects, the ideas surrounding them, and their greater implications for British and American influence.

1

Britain and Colonial Development

Just before the turn of the twentieth century, Joseph Chamberlain, the recently-appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies, expressed a new way of thinking about the British role in its empire. "I regard many of our Colonies as being in the condition of undeveloped estates, and estates which can never be developed without Imperial assistance."[5]

Chamberlain's ideas would inform much of British thinking about colonial development in the postwar period. From the start, the British considered themselves to be necessary agents of development within their colonies. Throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, Britain conducted a number of development projects to improve conditions in its colonies, reap the economic rewards, and raise its national prestige. Ultimately, as the case study of the East African Groundnuts Scheme will demonstrate, these initiatives were not always successful. However, they serve to reveal the supreme importance Britain placed on developing its colonies to bolster its global reputation after the Second World War.

* * *

As Secretary of State, Chamberlain promised to consider investing British money into those estates "which may be developed for the benefit of their population and for the

[5] Joseph Chamberlain, quoted in George C. Abbot, "A Re-examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act," *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Feb., 1971), p. 1.

benefit of the greater population which is outside."[6] The first Colonial Development Act was passed in 1929 and formalized Chamberlain's desire to "assist" territories. It provided up to £1m per year for development projects in the colonies.[7]

Sir Frederick Lugard elaborated on Chamberlain's ideas about British involvement in the colonies. In 1922, Lugard, once the Governor of Nigeria, wrote about the Empire's "dual mandate" in tropical Africa. He proposed that Britain should be responsible for both the *development* of its colonies' resources and the *welfare* of their people.[8] "Development" of colonial people had previously referred to mere population growth, but the broader "welfare" included nutrition, health, education, and overall wellbeing. In the eyes of Lugard, British colonialism should now truly be a mutually beneficial relationship.

Lugard was quick to emphasize that "mutually beneficial" meant that the British, too, would reap certain rewards – an arrangement that continued to characterize British colonial development. "Let it be admitted at the outset," he wrote, "that European brains, capital, and energy have not been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy." Instead, "Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress

---

[6] Joseph Chamberlain, quoted in George C. Abbot, "A Re-examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act," *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Feb., 1971), p. 1.

[7] Peter Williams and Adrian Moyes, "Not By Governments Alone: The Role of British Non-Government Organisations in the Development Decade," (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1964), p 18.

[8] H.W. Arndt, "Economic Development: A Semantic History," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol, 29, No. 3 (Apr. 1981), p. 463.

to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfill this dual mandate."[9]

Further cementing this shift away from old-fashioned, exploitative notions of imperialism, the government expanded on its first development Act to create the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940. Australian historian W.K. Hancock commented on the significance of the Act two years later, predicting, "'development and welfare' will probably be the cry of the generation which follows the present one."[10]

While the spirit behind the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was certainly meaningful, the legislation did not immediately inspire the changes it envisioned. World War II required most of Britain's money, manpower and attention, and the Development and Welfare Act was not properly funded or staffed. In 1944, Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Stanley lamented the Act's empty promises, writing that it was a "magnificent gesture," but "for reasons outside our control, it has remained little but a gesture. Shortages of technical staff, of materials, and of man-power have largely prevented the translation of this legislative permission into reality."[11]

But, Stanley argued in a 1944 cabinet memorandum, the time had come for real effort to be put into the legislation. He emphasized the importance of taking action before the war concluded. "The next few years may well determine the future course of the Colonial Empire. The participation of the Colonies in the war and the gratitude felt by

---

[9] Baron Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922) p. 617.
[10] W.K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. 2, *Problems of Economic Policy 1918-1939*, 2 pts. (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), pt. 2, p. 267.
[11] Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Cabinet Memorandum, quoted in A.N. Porter and A.J. Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, 1938-64: Volume 1, 1938-51 (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 208

this country for their efforts have increased our awareness of past deficiencies in our administration."[12] A thankful British public would be unsatisfied if the Act remained a mere gesture, as would many of the colonial subjects, who grew accustomed to a certain standard of living while fighting with the British. Stanley requested that the Act be extended for an additional ten years from 1946, and that the annual sum allotted should be increased by five million pounds every three years (to £10, £15, and £20 million annually).[13] To Stanley, these fees to were trivial when one considered the stakes:

> My feeling is that in the years to come, without the Commonwealth and Empire, this country will play a small rôle in world affairs, and that here we have an opportunity which may never recur, at a cost which is not extravagant, of setting the Colonial Empire on lines of development which will keep it in close and loyal contact with us. To say now in 1945 that with these great stakes at issue we shall not be able to afford 15 million in 1949, or 20 million in 1953, is a confession of our national impotence in the future.[14]

Stanley's insistence that colonial development was integral to Britain's ability to maintain global influence suggests the changing role Britain saw for itself in the postwar world.

One inescapable reality of that world was Britain's dire financial situation, which required some scaling back of overseas obligations. In 1952, a Cabinet Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs considered that task. The paper aimed to "examine where if anywhere our responsibilities can be reduced so as to bring them more into line with our available resources." But regarding foreign obligations, the memorandum found "few ways to effect any reductions" that would "provide immediate

---

[12] Stanley, Cabinet Memorandum, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 1, p. 208
[13] Ibid, p. 209.
[14] Ibid, p. 211.

relief to our economic difficulties." They were not willing to forgo, for instance, their obligations to the "maintenance of security and economic and social development in colonial territories."[15]

The British were acutely aware of the impact decolonization would have on their world power status. A primary concern was jeopardizing the "special relationship" with the United States. "Their attitude toward us," wrote the Secretary of the State for Foreign Affairs in 1952, "will depend largely on our status as a world Power and upon their belief that we are ready and willing to support them."[16] Prestige, then, was crucial – and fragile. For "once the prestige of a country has started to slide," wrote the Secretary, "there is no knowing where it will stop."[17]

In 1948, Ernest Bevin, Oliver Stanley's successor, elaborated on Stanley's analysis of Britain's postwar trajectory. His conclusions were decidedly optimistic. Describing the role he believed Britain would play in the Cold War, he predicted Britain would become the critical intermediary between the United States and the rest of Western Europe. As early as 1948, it was clear that the United States could offer the most as far as funding. But America's money was all but worthless without Britain to lead the effort in shaping opinions and serving as an example to the rest of Europe. Bevin proposed an anti-Soviet "Western Union," an alliance in which the U.K. would serve as the proverbial glue:

> Material aid will have to come principally from the United States, but the countries of Western Europe which despise the spiritual values of America will

---

[15] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "British Overseas Obligations", Cabinet Memorandum, 18 June 1952, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 2, p. 170.
[16] Ibid, p. 164.
[17] Ibid, p. 166.

> look to us for the political and moral guidance and for assistance in building up a counter attraction to the baleful tenets of communism within their borders and in recreating a healthy society wherever it has been shaken or shattered by the war. [18]

Bevin then went on to describe his vision for a "Western European system" that could rival the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Britain's colonies were a key part of this vision:

> Provided we can organise a Western European system such as I have outlined above, backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americas, it should be possible to develop our own power and influence equal to that of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. We have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them, and by giving a spiritual lead now we should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show clearly that we are not subservient to the Unite States of America or to the Soviet Union.[19]

Though Bevin's ideas seem a bit far-fetched, his point is clear: developing colonial resources ensured Britain's continued influence on the global stage.

Bevin was not alone in his rosy view of Britain's future. For fellow cabinet members Arthur Creech Jones and John Strachey, the immediate postwar years also "brought hopes of an imperial renaissance with the boundaries of the overseas empire simply shifted further to the east in Asia and into the Middle East and Africa as well."[20] The term "imperial renaissance" suggests a revival of interest in developing the colonies, but also a rebirth of the aims and strategies of those development efforts. Colonial development after the war was a higher-stakes game; Britain could not afford to lose its relationship with its colonies

---

[18] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy," 4 Jan 1948, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 1, p. 295.
[19] Ibid
[20] Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), pp. 207-8.

The United States, however, failed to recognize what Britain saw as the new nature and strategic importance of colonial development. According to the British ambassador to the U.S., anti-colonialism in America was a "traditional attitude rather than an active crusading force," an uninformed opinion based on old biases rather than recent facts:

> [Americans show a] willingness to assume, without enquiring into the facts, that the policies of the colonial powers have not really changed much in the last two centuries, that ruthless exploitation of subject peoples is still the order of the day, and that any doubt expressed by a metropolitan government about the ripeness of its dependent peoples for self-rule is necessarily insincere.[21]

Americans were not subtle about expressing their disapproval of colonialism in any form. They got their message across by publicly supporting territories on the cusp of independence, and by warmly welcoming leaders of those nationalist movements who visited the United States. Dr. Nmamdi Azikiwe, for instance, who would become the first Nigerian president, "attracted a surprising amount of attention" when he visited in 1950. Encouraging these emerging nations was "flattering to the American pride," since the U.S. tended to "regard these countries has having followed their example in throwing off the colonial yoke."[22] Here again is the American tendency to frame all modernization efforts in terms of their own experience; any nation pursuing independence and advancement must inevitably follow the American trajectory.

* * *

[21] HM Ambassador in Washington to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Confidential Despatch, 1950, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 1, p. 323.
[22] Ibid.

On the ground, colonial development functioned within a system of "indirect rule," a policy that the British practiced since the early 1900s. Created by Frederick Lugard, indirect rule allowed the traditional leaders to remain in power. British colonial administrators served as advisors, helping to guide these native leaders "toward a more rational, more efficient, more modern method of governance." Lugard wanted "the peasantry [to] see that the Government itself treats [the chiefs] as an integral part of the machinery of the administration...that there are not two sets of rulers…but a single Government in which the Native Chiefs have well-defined duties and an acknowledged status *equally* with the British officials."[23]

In practice, British colonial administrators likely did not see native chiefs quite as "equals," particularly in the early twentieth century. The policy of indirect rule, however, at least provided a more generous framework than, say, the French style. The policy had at least two major consequences for British-Nigerian relations: first, it established the British as "advisors," as superior outside authorities who directed various administrative projects; and second, it made the British far more "desirable" colonizers (relatively, of course) to the French, whose approach was harsher, crueler, and less politically sensitive.

William F.S. Miles' Hausaland Divided emphasizes this contrast, as it focuses on Hausaland, a region partitioned between French-ruled Niger and British-run Nigeria. In the 1980s, Miles spoke to Hausa on both sides of the border, and their memories of colonial rule (whether actually experienced or passed down from relatives) reflect these opposing impressions. According to a man from Yardaji, Nigeria, "The English eased problems for the peasants: they abolished raiding, fighting. But the French squeezed…the

[23] William F. S. Miles, Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) p. 92.

Hausa; they confiscated millet, they made men carry *giinya* [a large, heavy palm tree used for construction] until they died."[24]

Some Hausa descriptions of the British reveal a certain level of trust. The British were seen as more reasonable and less violent than the French. A Yardaji town crier declared, "The French are very prone to fighting. If you make them mad, they'll react very strongly. But Europeans of Ingliya [England] are very patient and not easily angered. When they left they didn't take everything with them – not like the French, who took everything that produced wealth."[25]

The British seemed to believe that Nigerian officials agreed with these citizens' observations, and they took pride in finding themselves in Nigerians' favor. Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies in the late 1950s, liked to quote the Prime Minister of Nigeria, who proclaimed the British to have been "first masters, then leaders, and finally partners, but always friends."[26] The quote is, of course, very self-serving, and the next chapter will show how many Nigerians disagreed with their Prime Minister on the label of "friends." Nigerians' preference of the British over the French, however, was important in setting the British up to believe they would remain close diplomatic allies post-independence.

As "leaders," if not "friends," Britain conducted an unprecedented number of colonial development projects in Nigeria and elsewhere in the 1950s. In 1955, the Colonial Office listed over 70 active major agricultural development initiatives, including

---

[24] Miles, Hausaland Divided, p. 101.
[25] Ibid, pp. 101-102.
[26] Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 11 October 1961, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 2, p. 560

pilot projects for water and soil conservation and food production; land improvement/resettlement schemes; cultivation projects for cotton and rice; tractor plowing; drainage and irrigation; and cooperative farming ventures, to name a few.[27] These projects were to yield crucial economic gains for Britain, . Perhaps more importantly, they also aimed to attract the world's attention and prove the merits of British colonial development. Despite increased funding, government attention, and "ambitious tone and confidence of colonial planners and technical advisers," however, many of these ventures failed to help Britain and its colonies economically or politically.[28]

One such venture, the East Africa Groundnut Scheme, is often cited as a classic case of development gone wrong, as yet another example of Western hubris manifesting in a poorly executed, grandiose project that resulted in more harm than good. While the Groundnut Scheme certainly was a failure, the motivations and planning behind it reveal British ideas that are consistent with its vision of colonial development and its relative position on the international stage. More simply, it also shows the extent to which Britain engaged in African development before decolonization was a foregone conclusion, and, indeed, how the British hoped to use its gains to put off the end of empire.

The Groundnut Scheme aimed to end hunger in East Africa by clearing more than 3 million acres of farmland in Tanganyika in order to produce up to 800,000 tons of groundnuts (peanuts) per year. A.J. Wakefield, one of the project's creators, envisioned the effort to be an agricultural revolution, and the colossal scale of the components

[27] Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, pp. 208-9.
[28] Ibid, p. 209.

speaks to that hope.[29] The project was the first of its kind in both its size and its execution: every part of the plan was to be fully mechanized. It was to be "a showcase of what science, technology, and the state could achieve."[30]

The new Labour government backed it enthusiastically, marking a shift in its traditionally anti-colonial rhetoric. *The Chicago Defender* reported, "As a result of the groundnuts scheme and other big development projects to be carried out by the Oversea and Colonial Development Corporation in Africa, the Tories are claiming to have converted the Labour Government to imperialism."[31] This change was telling of the new importance of large-scale development projects and what the British believed these efforts could do for their national reputation.

Despite government support and general public excitement about the project, the Groundnut Scheme had little chance of ever reaching its lofty goals. Insufficient planning, an underestimation of the tricky conditions in Kongwa (the original site), and unrealistic expectations undermined the effort from the start.[32] Although it quickly became clear that the project was encountering serious problems, policymakers spearheading the scheme were loath to quit early. They often spoke the scheme's significance – which they argued extended well beyond peanuts. It would serve as a reminder to the world that Britain was still a major imperial power. "The Groundnut Scheme has become an important symbol in our Colonial Empire," wrote the Minister of Food, who was in charge of the effort, in a 1949 memo. "If we abandon this and break up the scheme, the Africans not only in Tanganyika but throughout the whole of East Africa

---

[29] Ibid, p. 210.
[30] Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, p. 211.
[31] George Padmore, "Exploiting Africa," *The Chicago Defender*, July 24, 1948, p. 15
[32] Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, p. 213.

will suffer a great disappointment and it will be another blow for British prestige."[33] The minister, John Strachey, continued, "Surely we would lay ourselves open to every kind of criticism if we were to give up now….For the groundnuts scheme has come to be looked upon as a prototype for this kind of large scale development."[34]

Strachey articulated the most explicit link between colonial development and sustaining the British Empire. In a statement defending the massive cost of the scheme, Strachey declared, "We cannot in a modern world justify the possession of great undeveloped areas unless we develop them. The East African scheme and others that will follow in other parts of Africa are absolutely necessary for the survival of Great Britain and the Empire."[35]

Joseph Morgan Hodge argues that the "enormous scale and stunning collapse of the Groundnut Scheme make it something of an aberration in British colonial Africa." The project was officially canceled in 1951, and while colonial development certainly did not cease to be important, the high-profile, mammoth-scale projects like the Groundnuts Scheme were replaced with more targeted, more realistic operations that did not try to attract global attention in the same way. This approach would inform British efforts in Nigeria immediately leading up to and following independence in 1960: the British were interested in maintaining a close relationship, and relied on colonial development to help ensure their friendship. They were no longer interested, however, in using Nigerian development projects to prove their might to the world.

---

[33]Memorandum by the Minister of Food, "The East African Groundnuts Scheme," 11 November 1949, quoted in Porter and Sotckwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 1, p. 317
[34] Ibid, p. 316.
[35] Padmore, "Exploiting Africa," p. 15.

2

Nigerian Independence and the United States

"Nigeria, perhaps more than any other of the newly independent African states, most nearly approximates the spirit of the President's new aid concepts."[36]

- Rivkin Report, 1961

Upon taking office in 1961, John F. Kennedy declared the 1960s to be the "Decade of Development." He backed up his alliterative slogan with action: consolidating existing government development offices into the centralized United States Agency for International Development (USAID), capitalizing on the energy of young Americans by creating the Peace Corps, and immediately sending missions to countries he was interested in developing.

The Rivkin Report was the product of one such mission. Spearheaded by M.I.T. economist Arnold Rivkin, the Special U.S. Economic Mission to Nigeria left for Lagos in May of 1961. Like Kennedy, the commissioners believed Nigeria to be an exceptional candidate for U.S. aid. The newly independent nation boasted the largest population in Africa, had a great diversity of climate and terrain – "a rare thing in Africa, variegated agricultural base and an evolving mineral base" – and a growing GDP. In addition to those textbook factors, the report frequently noted Nigerians' determination, their readiness to adopt changes, and their "willingness to work hard."[37] "There was a

[36] Report of the Special US Economic Mission to Nigeria, "Rivkin Report," 1961, Record Group 286, P822, Box 6, Folder 1, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland, p. 3.
[37] Ibid, p. 6.

seriousness," the report continued, "a thoughtfulness, an earnestness about the many ministers, government officials, civil servants, and other people with whom the Mission talked about getting on with the job of economic development."[38]

Hard work; earnestness; determination. The qualities that the Rivkin commissioners praised in their report all happened to be quintessentially American. The mission's choice to continually comment on the Nigerians' bootstrapping attitude reveals some deep assumptions guiding American development ideology – an ideology that contrasted sharply with British-style colonial development. This chapter will explore the American approach to development and look at the first few years of Nigerian independence, a time when the British were contending with several foreign powers – chiefly, the U.S. – for Nigeria's attention. This chapter will lay the groundwork for the subsequent section, which will analyze three case studies of American and British development attempts.

In his article *Economic Development: A Semantic History*, H.W. Arndt argues that Americans saw development much like Marx did: as a spontaneous, natural, and inevitable process. For the British, on the other hand, development required planning and action on behalf of an outside government. These different ideas of development, writes Arndt, were no historical accident:

> In the United States…economic development *happened*, as immigrants from Europe streamed in; settlers went west to take up fertile land; communities established towns and cities; private companies constructed railways; and mining, logging, manufacturing, banking, and other enterprises grew, within (and sometimes without) legal rules made by government.[39]

---

[38] "Rivkin Report," p. 3.
[39] H.W. Arndt, "Economic Development: A Semantic History," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol, 29, No. 3 (Apr. 1981), p. 462.

The American experience differed dramatically from that of Australia, one of Britain's colonies, where conditions were not as suitable to economic development. Here, structured, creative, government-sponsored programs were necessary to render Australia a "modern" nation:

> In Australia's hostile environment, where settlers from the earliest convict days had to contend with drought, flood, pests, distance, and more drought, economic development did not happen. It was always seen to need government initiative, action to "develop" the continent's resources by bringing people and capital from overseas, by constructing railways, and by making settlement possible through irrigation and other "developmental" public works.[40]

Given this contrast between bottom-up and top-down styles of development, it makes sense that the United States' first government-sponsored development initiative was Harry Truman's Point Four program. The word "program" is generous: Point Four, considered a forerunner to USAID, never materialized in a concrete sense. Instead, it was more of a doctrine, encouraging development through technical assistance and small grants. Point Four was based on an American ideology of self-help, utilized the United States' "superior knowledge and vast wealth of information"[41], and could be applied anywhere. This universality was a crucial aspect; it implied that all societies were capable of "advancing." All that was needed was a bit of momentum in the form of American technical experts (and American dollars). In his speech announcing the plan, Truman emphasized the problem of "underdevelopment" among the "human family," conveying

---

[40] Arndt, "Economic Development: A Semantic History," p. 462.
[41] Samuel P. Hayes, as quoted in Stephen Macekura, "The Point Four Program and the Origins of International Development Policy," (M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 2008), p. 20.

the idea "that the destitute societies of the non-Western world were not trapped in an inevitable condition of 'backwardness' by the particularities of race or culture. They were instead struggling to travel along the very same historical trajectory as the world's more advanced nations."[42]

In her book Enlightened Aid, Amanda McVety argues that the very process of modernization as encouraged by Point Four not only *inspired* democratic political development, but also was *itself* a democratic process, one that any nation could undertake. "The first Point Four technicians," writes McVety, were "dedicated to the proposition that progress was a transformative process open to all, not just the historic explanation of the rise of the West. Yet it was impossible to separate the two, for the notion of progress that drove Point Four was intimately connected to the specific experiences of the United States over time."[43]

This American belief that Point Four could work anywhere – really, that development, and the same *types* of development could work anywhere – traces its roots farther back than Truman. Franklin Roosevelt, Truman's predecessor, described development in the Philippines and Indo-China as being interchangeable:

> In 1900 the Filipinos were not ready for independence nor could a date be fixed when they would be. Many public works had to be taken care of first. The people had to be educated in local, and finally, national governmental affairs. By 1933, however, we were able to get together with the Filipinos and all agree on a date, namely 1945, when they would be ready for independence. Since this development worked in that case, there is no reason why it should not work in the case of Indo-China.[44]

---

[42] Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 11.
[43] Amanda McVety, Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 2.
[44] Franklin D. Roosevelt, as quoted in Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution, p. 28

For Roosevelt, the Philippines and Indo-China were both backward Asian societies in need of American guidance, and thus identical approaches to assisting each nation were perfectly appropriate.

Compare that optimistic, inclusive American notion of development, one requiring no more effort than a proverbial push to get the underdeveloped countries racing along the (single) road to modernity, to the cautious words of British Treasury official M.T. Flett:

> We haven't very much faith in the capacity of the new Dominions to pull themselves up by their bootstraps….the flood of weekend speeches on the boundless possibilities of developing the Empire may be giving rise to quite exaggerated hopes both at home and in the Commonwealth.[45]

Written in 1952, Flett's letter echoes the sentiments expressed in a Colonial Office memorandum penned earlier that year:

> The Colonies may have enough people with the necessary education etc. to man a central Parliament, but they have not and for a very long time will not have anything like the resources to man and to staff local government bodies on the scale and at the level required if those bodies are to be effective.[46]

Flett and the author of the memo reject the idea that natives have the innate ability to create a "civilized" society by themselves. In a way, then, one could interpret the American perspective – that modernity was accessible to all – as being more progressive

---

[45] M.T. Flett (Treasury) to E. Melville (Colonial Office), 30 June 1952, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 2, pp. 176-7.
[46]Sir Charles Jeffries, Local Government Policy in Africa: Colonial Office Memorandum, 14 January 1952, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 2,, p. 138.

than the British viewpoint. However, two problematic assumptions guide American thinking: first, that that all societies not only *can* be, but *want* to be, like the U.S.; and second, that to become "modern," a country must follow the American path. While the British were not confident in colonial peoples' abilities to construct British-like institutions, they were also prepared to admit that British-style institutions were not for everyone. "It must first be frankly recognized," wrote Sir Charles Jeffries, an official in the Colonial Office, in a 1952 memo, "that the British way is not the only way compatible with democracy, and that a highly complex and by no means perfect or final system which has been evolved to suit conditions in Britain is not necessary transplantable to other quite different conditions."[47]

Just as Britain dismissed many of the ideals driving American development theory, the U.S. did not recognize the merits of British colonial development. For American officials, the very presence of colonialism negated the value of any possible improvements. The U.S. aimed its development policies toward helping those who had just escaped the throes of imperialism. In Truman's words, Point Four was designed to enable "millions of people in underdeveloped areas to raise themselves from the level of colonialism to self-support and ultimate prosperity."[48] One State Department policy paper argued that the Point Four program would "repel communism and replace imperialism."[49] Truman and his government thus framed U.S. development ventures as inherently anticolonial.

---

[47] Jeffries, Colonial Office Memo, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 2, p. 139.
[48] Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1956), p. 232.
[49] Latham, Right Kind of Revolution, p. 11.

British and American policies in Nigeria reflected their different perspectives on development, colonialism, and progress. In a general sense, Americans were more apt to offer up a lot of manpower and material resources and expect big results. Of course, the United States was better positioned than the U.K. to offer that money – but the mere fact the U.S. *had* the money did not mean Kennedy would spend it as grandly and as quickly as he did.

In his diary, Wolfgang Stolper describes the urgency with which Kennedy wanted to invest in Nigeria. Stolper was an American economist who served as an advisor in the early 1960s to the new Nigerian government. When he learned the Rivkin Commission was on its way to Lagos, he was warned that there would be no time for a detailed breakdown of plans. "The Americans will *not* talk individual projects," he remembered being told. "In fact [the Economic Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, George] Dolgin, said to me that they want to pump in money in sizeable amounts fast and one can't do that on a project basis. Hence we can expect general balance of payments support."[50]

Americans, led by President Kennedy, confidently emerged on the scene immediately after independence, armed with money to spend and men to commit. They were ready to embrace Nigeria as one of the world's newest underdeveloped areas that American technical assistance would help to "raise from the level of colonialism."

* * *

Before any of these American development efforts began in full-force, however, Nigeria and Britain had to sort out independence. Britain had been preparing for Nigerian

[50] Wolfgang Stolper, Inside Independent Nigeria: Diaries of Wolfgang Stolper, 1960-1962 (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), p. 108.

independence for several years before the official transfer of power in 1960, and Nigeria's eventual sovereignty was publicized well in advance of its realization. *The New York Times* ran an article in October 1958 – a full two years early – with the headline, "Nigeria's Independence Is Set for Oct. 1, 1960."[51]

Following this long period of preparation for self-government, the British and Nigerians maintained a special relationship of sorts between 1960 and 1962. The Nigerian government aimed to make Britain its closest ally in terms of trade and politics, and Whitehall was actively encouraging the so-called "Anglo-Nigerian Entente."

Nigeria's desire to enter into such a relationship can be traced back to the new nation's early leadership. The pro-British political and commercial elite were "content to allow such sentiments and outlook to influence Nigeria's foreign policy."[52] Indeed, upon independence, all three of Nigeria's main political parties articulated support for maintaining a close relationship with Britain. Sir Abubakar, Nigeria's Prime Minister and a member of the National People's Congress party (NPC), announced to the newly elected House of Representatives in January 1959 that he and other Regional Premiers all shared a desire for "the continuation of closer cooperation between Britain and Nigeria."[53] Dr. Azikiwe of the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) used the British-Nigerian relationship as a platform: a government controlled by the NCNC would "reckon with our unanimous desire to become full-fledged members of the British Commonwealth," he declared. "We should value our British connections as [a]

---

[51] "Nigeria's Independence Is Set for Oct. 1, 1960," *The New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1958, p. 5.
[52] Olasupo Ojedokun, "The Anglo-Nigerian Entente and its Demise, 1960-1962," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 9-10 (1971-2), p. 212.
[53] Ibid, p. 211. Quote from a speech to the House of Representatives, 18 January 1959

pearl of great price."[54] The leader of the Action Group, Chief Obafemi Awolow, maintained "a realistic foreign policy for Nigeria must be governed by a close, unflagging and conscientious tie and friendship with Britain."[55]

Economic interests lurked behind much of this pro-British rhetoric. Nigerian leaders were not oblivious to the fact that, upon independence, the U.K. was by far its most important trading partner. In 1956-1959, Britain accounted for 63, 61, 56, and 51% of Nigeria's exports, respectively, and – in the same years – 44, 43, 44, and 46% of its imports.[56] In terms of development, Britain was also responsible for more than half of Nigeria's foreign investment and around three-quarters of its aid.[57] Of the 1500 foreign technical experts in Nigeria between 1962 and 1966, over half were from Britain, and the percentage is even higher for 1960-1962.[58]

The Anglo-Nigerian entente reached its peak with the signing of the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement on January 5, 1961. This security agreement, which was crucial to Britain's access to certain African ports, was meant to symbolize the goodwill between Britain and Nigeria at independence.[59]

The agreement, however, was extremely controversial. Nigerian opposition was rampant, and took the form of public letters, demonstrations, editorials, and public

---

[54] Nmadi Azikiwe, as quoted in Ojedokun, p. 211.
[55] Ibid, p. 211.
[56] Ibid, p. 212.
[57] Robert B. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: From Kennedy to Reagan (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 19.
[58] Ojedokun, "The Anglo-Nigerian Entente," p. 214.
[59] Ibid, p. 219.

debates and lectures.[60] The dissent reflected the attitude of many Nigerians in regards to the British. The 1960 ethnographic work The New Nigerian Elite explores the different attitudes Nigerians held towards the former colonizers. Evident in the statements of Nigerian citizens was a tendency to blame the British for problems plaguing the young country. One Nigerian government employee, who trained at British and American institutions, attempted to explain the "low moral standards" characterizing Nigerian politics:

> Our people for a long time have seen the British exploit us and our territory to make profits for themselves. The officials here lived well in good homes, had servants, cars, long vacations and all the rest of it. Our people watched all this and no doubt came to the conclusion that people in power should do the same thing as a right, that since the British did it when they were the masters, then this must be the thing to do once you get into authority yourself. The politicians feel they are doing only what the British showed them how to do.[61]

The AG used these anti-British sentiments to its political advantage. In 1959, the NCNC and the NPC formed a coalition government, leaving the AG to assume the opposition. Nigeria's foreign policy became a negotiation between policies of the NCNC and the NPC – both pro-British platforms. Changing its tune in light of its minority-party status, the AG "now campaigned for the severance of such links" to the Crown. Party leader Chief Awolowo explained, "the temper of the younger generations of Nigerian

---

[60] Gordon J. Idang, "The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement," *African Studies Review*, vol. 13, No. 2 (Sep. 1970), pp. 227-251, p. 229.
[61] Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 133.

politicians and nationalists does not at all brook the retention of the present link with the Crown."[62]

The AG was also feeling a bit chilly toward the British as rumors circulated about British officials helping the NPC win in the 1959 Federal Elections. In this way, too, it appears, the British wanted to keep Nigeria close – and that meant having hand-selected leaders in power.[63]

Internal and external pressures led Nigerian leaders to look into widening its foreign contacts. In terms of Western powers, the United States became an attractive ally – one that made clear its intention of heavily investing in Nigeria.[64] American money was particularly desirable after the Nigerian Government committed itself to a six-year £653.8m Development Plan. Roughly half was expected to be funded by foreign aid.[65]

Britain's unstable economy encouraged Nigerians to cultivate closer relationships with countries like the U.S. While Britain gave 75% of Nigeria's foreign aid in 1962, it was responsible for only 15% in the years 1962-1966. Its share of Nigeria's exports – 63% in 1956 – fell to 38% by 1966, and its imports – a high of 47% in 1960 – decreased to 30% by 1966.[66]

In 1962, Nigeria abrogated the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact.[67] Nigeria became a republic in 1963, officially dismantling any special relationship that existed with Britain.[68] And so as British-Nigerian relations mellowed, and as the Nigerian government

---

[62] Ojedokun, "The Anglo-Nigerian Entente," p. 220.
[63] Ibid, p.221.
[64] Ibid, p. 224.
[65] Ibid, p. 223.
[66] Ibid, p. 224.
[67] Ibid, p. 228.
[68] Ibid, p. 227.

began to think more broadly about its foreign policy goals, it naturally welcomed the United States – and its money, projects, and personnel.

3

Comparing Development Initiatives: American and British Technical Assistance

This chapter examines two examples of development efforts in Nigeria: the Peace Corps and general British technical assistance policies. The Peace Corps, the famous brainchild of John F. Kennedy designed to send the youth of America to third-world states, was a single, ideologically-charged program that aimed to tackle a variety of issues. The British, meanwhile, opted for lower-profile projects or partnerships that built on existing relationships in Nigeria and had more moderate goals.

The Peace Corps

"The Free World and particularly the Nigerian public, has assumed that the United States Peace Corps will extend a significant helping hand to Nigeria in furthering her development….Since it is the intention of the Peace Corps to help Nigeria in a substantial way, exploratory talks should take place as soon as possible so that these expectations do not become anticlimactic through the passage of time."[69]

- Peace Corps Proposals for Nigeria

Just as President Kennedy sent the Rivkin Mission a mere five months after taking office, he mobilized support for the Peace Corps in Nigeria extraordinarily quickly. In July of 1961, the Peace Corps announced it would be training Nigeria-bound

[69] "Peace Corps Proposals for Nigeria," Mar. 23, 1961, National Archives, Record Group 286, P822, Box 5, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

volunteers at Harvard University,[70] and a similar program was already taking place at the University of California at Los Angeles.[71]

In a Peace Corps proposal for Nigeria from February 1961, policymakers outlined three areas where volunteers were needed: teaching English in primary schools, filling regular vacancies in secondary schools, and working in industrial development. The wide range of improvements volunteers sought to implement was possible because of superior American talent, resources, and expertise. "The feasibility of such programs," the proposal states, "rests principally on…the fact that the United States Government clearly has the capacity, as no one else probably has, to administer such a broad undertaking in a foreign country."[72] They were ultimately aiming for not only a broad Peace Corps effort, but also a deep one. "A truly effective Peace Corps program would eventually place several thousand teachers in selected schools [in Nigeria]."[73]

The proposal patronizingly commended Nigeria for understanding its own needs – needs that were defined by Western powers. The report cited the Ashby Commission, an education mission composed of Britons, Americans, and Nigerians that produced influential findings about Nigerian higher education in 1960. The Ashby report recommended that Nigeria modify some of its British-style universities to incorporate more aspects of American-style land grant colleges. It also suggested Nigeria hire scores of additional teachers – 7,000 more, according to the Peace Corps proposal.[74] Largely

---

[70] "Peace Corps Trains for Nigeria Program," *The New York Times*, July 20, 1961, pg. 14
[71] "Peace Corps Recruits 70 Teachers for Nigeria," *Chicago Daily Defender*, Jul. 13, 1961, pg. 5
[72] Program for the Peace Corps, Second Draft, Peace Corps Working Group, February 28, 1961, Record Group 286, Box 5, P822, p. 4.
[73] Ibid, pp. 3-.4
[74] Program for the Peace Corps," pp. 3-.4

because of the Ashby Commission, "Much more than before in Nigeria, education came to be considered very seriously as an "investment." Accepted almost in its entirety by the government, the Ashby report came to be regarded as Nigeria's education "bible" and, "whether in faithfulness to or in criticism of the Commission's recommendations, Nigerian educational developments since independence have hinged on the Commission's proposals."[75]

In a sense, Ashby paved the way for the Peace Corps in Nigeria. A.I. Asiwaju, a professor at the University of Lagos, argued that because of the Western composition of the commissioners, Ashby proposals "were conceived rather narrowly within, and with much bias for, the Anglo-American experience and resources, especially for assistance."[76] The report insisted on the need to import foreign teachers "as an interim measure." Given the Nigerian government's acceptance of the Ashby report, Americans extrapolated that Nigerians would similarly welcome the Peace Corps. After all, the Peace Corps provided a solution to the teacher shortage that Ashby identified. The policymakers behind the Peace Corps proposal were confident the program would be accepted, as "Nigeria is considerably ahead of most of the underdeveloped world in recognizing the need for teachers from abroad."[77]

Kennedy announced the Peace Corps on March 1, 1969, just a few months before volunteers began training to be sent to Nigeria. A telegram from Washington to members of the Foreign Service listed guidelines for speaking about the new program. The memo directed officers to emphasize that the Peace Corps would go only "where wanted and

---

[75] A.I. Asiwaju, "Ashby Revisited: A Review of Nigeria's Educational Growth, 1961-1971," *African Studies Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Apr. 1972), p. 2.
[76] Asiwaju, p. 3.
[77] Program for the Peace Corps, pp. 3-4.

needed," reminded them to "avoid placing Peace Corps in 'Cold War' context," and noted that the programs' intentions were broad. The United States wanted "overall progress," and aimed to further industrial and agricultural development and provide general technical assistance.[78]

In Nigeria, reactions to the Peace Corps idea were mixed. While leadership at the very top was supportive of the idea, some lower-level Nigerian officials harbored concerns that Americans conveniently ignored. Adam Skapski, the Ford Foundation Advisor in Lagos in the 1960s, penned a confidential letter to USOM (United States Operation Mission) Nigeria director Joel Bernstein in March 1961 alerting him to opposition he encountered to the Peace Corps idea. Skapski had met with two close friends, Permanent Secretary Mr. Imoukhuede and Chief Inspector Somade of the Western Region Ministry of Education. At the end of their talk, they asked Skapski to "treat our conversation as private and confidential." However, wrote Skapski, "I do think it is my duty to inform you" about their "rather violent refusal."[79] They had several major issues with the program, all of which pointed to a lack of awareness on the part of the U.S.

To start, these Nigerian officials saw the Peace Corps as mainly a "political gesture," an "instrument in the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for favors of the undeveloped countries."[80] Nigerians did not want their country used as a dumping ground for American Cold War propaganda. As the Peace Corps telegram

---

[78] Telegram, from Washington DC, March 1, 1961 at 2:45 pm, Foreign Service of the United States of America, Washburn, Record Group 286, Box 5, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
[79] Confidential Government memorandum from Adam Skapski to Joel Bernstein, March 24, 1961, "Peace Corps & the W.R. Recruitment Mission to the U.S," Record Group 286, Box 5, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
[80] Ibid.

implied, American policymakers anticipated this concern. Skapski showed them a pamphlet titled "President Kennedy Establishes Peace Corps," which contained information that he believed convinced them this wasn't a mere "gesture."

Second, they voiced concern over the local political implications of accepting Peace Corps teachers. Imoukhuede and Somade were members of the Action Group, a Nigerian political party popular in the Western Region of Nigeria that did not think highly of American (or other Western) intervention in their country. If the Western Region allowed Peace Corps volunteers, the government would be accused of "double loyalty" to both Nigeria and the United States. They welcomed the idea of teachers, but not all of the ideological baggage that came with the Peace Corps. They proposed instead that the Western Region hire the teachers directly; "their identity as the P.C. members would have to be lost."[81]

Skapski believed these leaders' concerns were valid enough to warrant a letter, but Americans overrode the Nigerians' protests. A week before Skapski's letter, Bernstein had sent a Foreign Service dispatch marveling at how Nigerians have shown "increasing interest in the Peace Corps idea since it was aired in the Presidential campaign." Clearly, Bernstein had not been talking to Skapski's friends. On April 4, a few days after Skapski's letter, a telegram sent to the Foreign Service officially opened Nigeria to the Peace Corps. "Because of interest already shown by Nigerian people and government officials in receiving Peace Corps assistance, we would like to consider

[81] Memo from Adam Skapski to Joel Bernstein

Nigeria as the first major African Country" to be nominated for "Peace Corps activities."[82]

The British were also critical of the Peace Corps idea. Wolfgang Stolper's colleague, Toby Lewis, was in the British Colonial Service serving as an advisor to the Nigerian government. Like Stolper, he attended meetings with the Rivkin mission, and during one of these, showed Rivkin his paper on the dangers of the Peace Corps. Rivkin was "skeptical" of these concerns, a reaction that Stolper maintains had as much to do with who Lewis was than what he had to say:

> This is a good example of the injustice done to the British Colonial Service. Back home no one raised any questions about the Peace Corps, about the problems it might raise in the recipient country, about the possibilities of it backfiring on the U.S. No American did here, either. Toby in the course of his duties did. This is now used to show how conservative the British Colonial Service is because it cannot grasp the great new ideas![83]

In Stolper's account, Rivkin treated Lewis as a representative of the dead hand of the past, a stodgy has-been who needed to make room for fresh (American) ideas. Clearly, U.S. officials dismissed Nigerians' and Britons' objections, as Peace Corps volunteers began arriving later that fall.

These fresh, American ideas were tested in October of 1961, when the Peace Corps experienced its first scandal in Nigeria. The incident (and the fallout) reveals much about the uncertain relationship between Nigerians and Americans in Nigeria's early years of independence.

---

[82] Telegram, Foreign Service of the United States of America, April 4, 1961 Record Group 286, P822, Box 5, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
[83] Stolper, Inside Independent Nigeria, p. 119.

A Peace Corps trainee named Marjery Michelson wrote a postcard to a friend back home, in which she described the "squalor and absolutely primitive living conditions both in the cities and the bush" in Nigeria, writing that Nigerians at the University of Ibadan "go to the bathroom in the streets." The postcard was never mailed, and it accidentally fell into the hands of a University of Ibadan student who promptly publicized Michelson's words. According to Murray Frank, the Western Regional Director of the Peace Corps in Nigeria, when Peace Corps volunteers went to the dormitory dining halls for lunch the day after the postcard was discovered, there was a copy of the letter at each place.[84] Nigerians were scandalized; a group of university students organized a protest calling for all Peace Corps volunteers to leave.

The American reaction was not one of complete reticence. An article from the Los Angeles Times declared Michelmore's observation of the poor living conditions "hardly a startling revelation." The incident, the author wisely insisted, provided a lesson in how such criticism "touched an exposed nerve in Nigeria's infant nationalism." The article goes on to say that in future dealings with similarly underdeveloped nations, Americans should exercise caution in expressing such observations – even if they are accurate. "The *backward* countries to which corps units are being sent differ widely in customs and conditions, but all probably share the same sensitivity to criticism demonstrated in Nigeria. As a result corps members have been warned to avoid saying anything that would antagonize the local population, even if what they might say is true."[85]

---

[84] Friends of Nigeria Newsletter, Fall 1999, http://www.friendsofnigeria.org/Newsletter_files/0401%20Fall%201999.pdf

[85] "The Peace Corps' First Skirmish," *The Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 17, 1961, p. B4

Another article in the *Chicago Daily Tribune* quoted Oregon Senator Maurine Neuberger defending Michelmore's postcard, pointing out that "not one Nigerian denied that everything Margery Michelmore" wrote was true.[86] *The Washington Post* wrote that the students, while "understandably piqued," might "do well to bear a few considerations in mind," like the fact that no one had any business reading her mail, and that what she said was not mean, patronizing, or untruthful. After all, "Nigeria wouldn't be getting Peace Corps help if it were economically and culturally developed as, say, Cambridge, Mass." The Nigerian government insisted U.S.-Nigerian relations must not be jeopardized over the "foolish writings of one adolescent schoolgirl." *The Washington Post* encouraged the government to tell the Ibadan students to "quit behaving like a lot of adolescents, too."[87]

The Peace Corps Nigeria director later reflected on the incident, admitting that the Americans did not really grasp the greater implications of the postcard. While the Peace Corps volunteers may have seen themselves as anti-imperial heroes, the representatives a system that ran colonialism out of practice, many Nigerians did not perceive them that way:

> We knew that Nigeria was newly independent but, in retrospect, I don't know if we fully absorbed how deeply this influenced the students' behavior. It had not been very long since independence had been won. The visages of the colonial period were still all around, including and especially white people who symbolized a colonial past. A Nigerian self-image based on new freedom was developing. Nigerians, at least by this group of young intellectuals, demanded respect.[88]

---

[86] "Defends Peace Corps Girl's Africa Report: Nigeria Should Admit It," *Chicago Daily Tribune,* Oct. 25, 1961, p. A4
[87] "Growing Pains," *The Washington Post, Times Herald,* Oct. 18, 1961, p. A16.
[88] Friends of Nigeria Newsletter

Eventually, the issue dissipated, but the outrage of the Nigerian students, the push back by the American public, and the attempt by the Nigerian government to dispel any lingering hostility point to the shaky relations between Americans, the Nigerian public, and the Nigerian government. It was becoming clear that of the countries interested in investing in Nigeria, the United States was the real gold mine, and the Nigerian government actively encouraged that partnership. But clearly, students and other Nigerian citizens were not as impressed by American dollars. At a USOM/Nigeria Conference held in Ibadan in 1961, participants attended a session that presented Nigerians' perceptions of Americans. The notes highlight some general impressions:

> Nigerian view of US highly subjective, lacks empathy, ebulliently self-confident and self-assertive as parental hand of UK withdrawn….Americans woefully ignorant re: Nigeria; take ourselves too seriously; too concerned [with] objective facts and subjective morality; over-anxious for action and over-rigid in conflicts when palaver and will dispose of most problems; re: global conflicts, too defensive, frightened and unwilling to see both sides - Nigerians value open-mindedness and self-confidence and feel U.S. should display more of both…only small Nigerian elite understand US principles and policies and accept them.[89]

These impressions make clear that Americans were not welcomed with open arms by many of the Nigerian people. The Nigerian government's favorable relationship with the United States can be attributed to the Americans' willingness to fund Nigerian programs. As the Peace Corps incident and the above views illustrate, Nigerians were far from embracing the American presence in their country.

British Technical Assistance

[89] USOM/Nigeria Program Conference, Ibadan, Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 1961, Record Group 286, Box 6, National Archives Building, College Park, Maryland, pp. 44-45.

The British were long interested in offering technical assistance programs in Africa. They established a mutual assistance program in Ghana in 1958 and immediately talked of replicating this initiative in Nigeria.[90] British officials made a point of starting to plan such a program early, well before independence, so that the transition would be much more seamless than it proved to be in Ghana. According to a 1959 brief for the Secretary of State, "the Nigerians have shown a natural desire to continue" the many professional and technical links between Nigeria and the U.K., so any technical assistance program proposals would be welcomed.[91]

As early as the late 1950s, the British sensed the United States would prove to be a threat to their relationship with Nigeria. The desire to keep up with U.S. development tactics heavily influenced British technical assistance planning. For instance, Americans and other foreign experts competing for influence were offering technical assistance at no cost, and the Point Four technicians had the prestige associated with American development agencies – like the International Cooperation Administration (the forerunner to USAID) – behind them. Western Governor J.D. Rankine wrote in a 1959 foreign dispatch of the growing acceptance of the idea that a foreign "expert" should be provided for free. "Such an expert," he continued, "especially if he has the glamour of the label of some international agency behind him, is to be preferred to the expert for whose services one has to pay in full in the good old-fashioned way." Quite directly, he writes, "I do not need to remind you of the manner in which the aid given by various United States

[90] N.V. Brief No. 3, Technical Assistance, British Archives, FCO 141/13634, 603070.
[91] "Brief for the Secretary of State: Technical Assistance", May 15, 1959, British Archives, FCO 141/13634, 603070,

agencies are advertised and glamourised."[92] Rankine goes on to suggest that British technical experts, in order to compete with their esteemed American counterparts, start offering assistance at little or no cost.[93]

Importantly, however, Rankine believed that all things being equal, Nigerians would prefer to take advantage of British assistance over any other. "Although Ministers here are at present attracted towards Israel and the United States of America, and by the glamour of the international agency tag, I do not think they would go elsewhere for experts if British experts could be made available readily free of cost."[94] The British had the advantage of experience in Nigeria; foreigners who had come in as "masters" but left as "partners." In the infant years of Nigerian statehood, the British believed relationships could compete with money.

In May 1959, C.G. Eastwood of the Colonial Office wrote to the last Governor-General of Nigeria, Sir James Robertson, inquiring about entering into an agreement for technical assistance between the U.K. and Nigeria. Eastwood proposed the plan be modeled off of the program in Ghana and the Colombo Plan, a development initiative for parts of Asia and the Pacific created in 1950. Types of assistance would include organizing and funding educational opportunities for Nigerians in Britain, like training courses or research appointments at U.K. institutions; British-staffed missions to look

[92] Governor, J.D. Rankine, Despatch on Nigeria (Western Region) No: Personal 16, 9 May 1959, British Archives, p. 4.
[93] Rankine, Despatch, p. 5.
[94] Ibid, pp. 5-6.

into Nigerian problems, like education or agriculture; or funding, staffing, or equipping Nigerian schools.[95]

Continuing a familiar theme, Eastwood emphasized the *mutual* aspect of a technical assistance program. While he spent the bulk of the letter outlining services the U.K. could offer to Nigeria, he understood the initiative to be a true partnership:

> We here are very conscious…that as Nigeria's professional and technical services grow and her research institutions are developed, there will increasingly be available in Nigeria information and advice which may prove valuable…to the United Kingdom. For instance people from England may well want to come to Ibadan to see how an up to date teaching hospital should be laid out, and Nigeria may well have much to teach the U.K. or her dependencies on Education and Agriculture.[96]

British development rhetoric constantly noted the rewards that the United Kingdom would reap rewards from its efforts. American rhetoric, meanwhile, focused largely on the improvements of the recipient nations. Mutual benefits were implied, particularly in regard to Cold War security, but the United States often presented itself as a charitable benefactor, sharing with the world what made America great. Michael Latham best captured the American developer's attitude in his introduction of Staging Growth, arguing that experts "claimed superior knowledge" of how problems might be solved, "implicitly praising their own modern expertise, rationality, and analytical toughness." Simultaneously, they believed their work to be "part of an altruistic obligation, a project through which they would share their domestic accomplishments

[95] C.G. Eastwood to Sir James Robertson, 6 May 1959, British Archives, FCO 141/13634, 603070, p. 1.
[96] Eastwood to Robertson, p. 2.

with a world that desperately wanted to emulate them."[97] In other words, they could feel proud of themselves for having the answers to other societies' problems, and feel good about themselves for venturing to solve those problems in the first place. In some ways, then, while the U.K. could certainly be criticized for being exploitative or un-generous in its constant insistence on mutual benefits, it is the United States' approach to development that seems more paternalistic.

While an emphasis on a partnership and mutual benefits remained constant in British policy from pre to post-independence, other ideas changed. After the Groundnuts Scheme failed so fantastically, there was no second attempt at an "agricultural revolution." Funds were still tight in the U.K., and particularly with the onslaught of grand American projects, there was a new emphasis on targeted, manageable projects.

One scheme took the form of the "Commonwealth Project." David Stirling, a World War II hero and founder of the Special Air Service, was behind the proposed program, in which the U.K. would sponsor a "gigantic" initiative bringing non-university educated Africans from newly independent countries over to Britain for on-the-job training. They would be doing technical, artisan, lower administration, and skilled agricultural work. Such a program would go beyond mere financial assistance. Rather, for "Britain to initiate the scheme…would be a practical example to the world of her awareness of her responsibilities to Africa and of her willingness to stretch her great

[97] Engerman, Gilman, Haefele, and Latham, Staging Growth, p. 7.

resources of experience and wealth to the benefit of the emerging nations of that Continent even if at some discomfort to herself."[98]

Similarly to the Peace Corps, the Commonwealth Project was designed to involve *all* Britons. Its success relied upon support from the ground up, in which British people – not just the government – would be prepared "to squeeze up and make room on the work benches" for Africans coming over to the U.K. "to undertake a vast imaginative programme of trades and technical training." Stirling's program called on the British people to "take the problems of Africa to their hearts and to give Africans within their own homes an understanding of our way of life." [99]

The project never materialized, which is indicative of the kinds of initiatives the British government was willing to support. This massive endeavor recalled large-scale projects that were costly, contentious, and usually ineffective. In a 1954 memo about colonial development finance, a British exchequer official wrote, "In many important services expenditure by U.K. Departments is being held at its present level, or reduced; desirable developments in national health, education and other social services cannot be made for financial reasons."[100]

While the Commonwealth Project resembled the Peace Corps in terms of scale, officials used the Peace Corps as a reference for what *not* to do. The Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Norman F. Harris, maintained that the U.S. relied too

---

[98] Foreign Service Despatch, 13 September 1961, Subject: Proposed Practical Trade and Technical Training for Adults, Record Group 286, Box 8, Folder: Geographic File – UK, P 822, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
[99] Foreign Service Despatch
[100] Colonial Development and Welfare: the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 November 1954, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, p. 351.

heavily on orthodox techniques to educate underdeveloped peoples. In a letter to Stirling, he suggested avoiding putting "too much bias" on such techniques. "Unless I am very much mistaken," he wrote, "it is exactly here that the Kennedy 'Peace Plan' will go wrong."[101]

Criticisms of the Peace Corps abounded in the Commonwealth Project "working committee" meeting. According to the situation report from the meeting, "almost without exception, every delegate present condemned the Kennedy Peace Corps plan." The report noted the sour African attitude towards the idea, which was likely "based on misunderstanding probably provoked by…the Americans' own tendency to show lack of tact at times in dealing with newly independent states."[102]

While the hopes of those like Ernest Bevin and Oliver Stanley were becoming increasingly less realistic, the British were still committed to the idea of colonial development – just on a smaller scale. "Progress in Colonial Development depends Colonial administrative and technical resources," stated a Colonial Development Finance memo from 1954. "These are improving, but it is a slow process, and the acceleration of the pace of development must be slow and steady to keep step with this process."[103]

---

[101] Letter from Norman F. Harris (Minister of Information and Broadcasting) to James Coltart, Esq., David Stirling copied, 17 April 1961, Record Group 286, Box 8, P 822, Folder: Geographic File – UK, National Archives Building, College Park, Maryland.
[102] The Commonwealth Project: Situation Report from the Chairman of the Working Committee, May 1961, National Archives, RG 286, P822, Box 8, Folder: Geographic File – UK
[103] Colonial Development and Welfare: the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 November 1954, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, p. 351.

4

Conclusion: Britain Phased Out

In October of 1961, Marjorie Belcher, the AID[104] Liaison Officer in London, wrote a rather tense letter outlining issues with the new University of Nigeria at Nsukka. In theory, the United States, represented by Michigan State University, and Britain, represented by the University of London, were to serve as equal advisors to the new Nigerian school. But Belcher had just spoken with a University of London professor, who had expressed his "distress" and "hurt feelings" about the project. According to this Professor John Lewis, London University had "stood ready to give assistance to the new university for the past year," but was never contacted by Nsukka officials.

Belcher passed along Lewis' concerns to Bill Kontos, the Deputy Director of United States Operation Mission (USOM) Nigeria. "I have suspected for months that something was wrong with regard to British cooperation at Nsukka but this is the first time that I have been able to get an expression of it…I do hope you can consider this as a priority problem." She emphasized the importance of significant British involvement: "Personally, I am convinced that even if the University of Nigeria proves a successful US/Nigerian effort, it will be a great tragedy if we cannot make it a joint US/UK/Nigerian experiment."[105]

---

[104] Technically, USAID was not created until November 1961. In October, Belcher was the International Cooperation Agency (ICA) Liaison Officer; ICA was AID's forerunner.
[105] Letter - University of London and University of Nigeria To Mr. C. William Kontos, Deputy Director, USOM Nigeria From Marjorie Belch, ICA Liaison officer October 5, 1961, Record Group 286, Box 8, P822, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

Kontos' reply illustrated the definitively backseat role the British had come to play in Nsukka and in Nigerian higher education initiatives more broadly:

> We agree it is necessary to define more clearly the role of the University of London in the University of Nigeria. We will, I am sure, be able to suggest ways that we could very usefully apply the University of London staff and resources to better advantage. The problem, however, is to persuade the University of Nigeria to request such help.[106]

Nsukka was receiving assistance (monetary and otherwise) from Michigan State University. Its immediate needs were being satisfied by American help; there was no urge to look any further. Belcher ended by admitting that London University "could not in any case do as much as Michigan State financed by ICA."[107]

As the 1960s progressed, an increasing number of development projects in Nigeria fell under the control of Americans. The great British hopes borne in the immediate post-war years faded as the U.S.' financial superiority proved to be unbeatable. That is not to say that Britain pulled out of Nigeria completely; the former colonizer was still active in providing technical assistance – but only when asked.

A 1964 survey of British technical assistance devoted an entire chapter to "request procedures," outlining the ways countries wishing to receive British assistance should go about asking for aid. Unlike the Peace Corps, which Americans proposed to Nigerians, British projects came about at the request of the recipient. "A cardinal principle of British technical assistance policy is to give aid only in response to requests emanating from the

---

[106] Bill Kontos, Letter to Marjorie Belcher, Subject: University of London and University of Nigeria, 9 October 1961, Record Group 286, P822, Box 8, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
[107] Ibid.

developing countries themselves."[108] A 1962 White Paper outlines the philosophy behind this policy, stating, "Not the giving but the receiving countries are in the best position to decide on their needs for outside help, and it is for them to say which of these needs they judge to be most urgent. Britain's job is to respond to the requests they make as best she may within the inevitable limits of men and money available."[109]

The final few words of that sentence – "limits of money and men" – are key to understanding this policy. Even if they wanted to, the British could not execute massive, expensive programs like the Peace Corps that could be applied universally. As early as 1954, after the Groundnuts Scheme and similar failures, the British government was encouraging colonies to start relying more heavily on their own resources. "We think the Colonies could do more from local resources than the Colonial Office allows. This is particularly true of Nigeria, which accounts for 27.5% of the C.D. and W. [Colonial Development and Welfare] territorial allocation now asked for by the Colonial Office, and 21.5% of the external loan finance."[110]

It is not certain, however, that the British were interested in pushing big programs like the Peace Corps even if they could afford to do so. In the example of the University of Nsukka, Professor John Lewis lamented the fact that he was not *asked* to help. Marjorie Belcher noted the "traditional position of London University of not making assistance available until asked to do so." This position finds its roots in Britain's

---

[108] Peter Williams, "British Aid – Technical Assistance: A Factual Survey of Britain's Aid to Overseas Development through Technical Assistance," Second Edition, London: Overseas Development Institute Ltd., 1964, p. 17.
[109] Ibid, p. 45.
[110] Colonial Development and Welfare: The Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 November 1954, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 2, p. 351.

historical experience with development, in which a few themes prove to be consistent. First, the British did not subscribe to the kind of miraculous, all-encompassing development the United States did. The failure of the Groundnuts Scheme, whose grand scale and broad mission represented a departure from the norm, reinforced that skepticism. Secondly, the British were interested in forging partnerships where both parties would benefit. It was easier to determine reciprocal benefits when grappling with a smaller program, where the aims and outcomes would be more manageable. Therefore, while finances can explain much of Britain's approach to development in the 1960s, the role of ideology should not be discounted.

* * *

In October of 1961, Iain Mcleod delivered his final speech as Secretary of State for the Colonies. He reflected on his tenure, and noted what still needed to be done in the so-called "British Imperial Mission":

> I believe in what our grandfathers would have called the British Imperial mission. It is not yet completed. Since the world began, empires have grown and flourished and decayed, some into a sort of genteel obscurity, some leaving little heritage and culture behind them, some even no more than stones covered by the sand. They are one with Nineveh and Tyre, but we are the only empire leaving behind us a coherent political scheme of development. We are the only people who, with all the hesitations and failures that there have been, are genuinely resolved on turning, to use Harold Macmillan's phrase, an empire into a commonwealth and a commonwealth into a family. That is what we are doing.[111]

[111] Speech by the Rt. Hon. Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Conservative Party Conference, 11 October 1961, quoted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, vol. 2, p. 560.

The British Empire, according to Macleod, left behind a legacy of coherent political development. In Nigeria, they bequeathed British-style education systems, the English language, and a love of soccer, to name a few. These vestiges from a colonial past intermingle with reminders of a different kind of presence – an American modernization mission. The Peace Corps still sends volunteers to Nigeria; USAID has offices in Abuja; and private American development groups have flocked to the country. Just last month, the Clinton Foundation held a "Day of Service in New York City and Nigeria."[112]

In the development realm, as in general political matters, it is obvious which Western power proved to be more influential. Tracing British colonial development from its inception, to its peak in the immediate pot-war years, to its "settling down" in the 1960s, reveals an important narrative that encompasses many of the strategies, ideologies, and policies that Britain invented for its empire. And while all empires for all of time have "grown and flourished and decayed" in the way the British Empire did, this one, Macleod was confident, would leave behind a uniquely benign legacy.

[112] The Clinton Foundation website, http://www.clintonfoundation.org/blog/2014/03/24/day-service-new-york-city-and-nigeria

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Agency for International Development. Economic Mission to Nigeria. *Report of the Special U.S. Mission to Nigeria*. June 1961.

Agency for International Development, Peace Corps 1961, Record Group 286, P822, Box 5, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

"Defends Peace Corps Girl's Africa Report: Nigeria Should Admit It," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Oct. 25, 1961, p. A4

Friends of Nigeria Newsletter, Fall 1999, http://www.friendsofnigeria.org/Newsletter_files/0401%20Fall%201999.pdf

"Growing Pains," *The Washington Post, Times Herald*, Oct. 18, 1961,

Lugard, Frederick. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922) p. 617.

"Nigeria's Independence Is Set for Oct. 1, 1960," *The New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1958

Padmore, George. "Exploiting Africa," The Chicago Defender, July 24, 1948

"The Peace Corps' First Skirmish," *The Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 17, 1961

"Peace Corps Recruits 70 Teachers for Nigeria," *Chicago Daily Defender*, Jul. 13, 1961

"Peace Corps Trains for Nigeria Program," *The New York Times*, July 20, 1961

Porter, A.N. and Stockwell, A.J. British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, 1938-64: Volumes I and II. London: Macmillan Press, 1989.

Stolper, Wolfgang. Inside Independent Nigeria: Diaries of Wolfgang Stolper, 1960 1962. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2003.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1956), p. 232.

USOM/Nigeria Program Conference, Ibadan, Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 1961, RG 286, Box 6, National Archives Building, College Park, MD.

Secondary Sources

Abbot, George C. "A Re-examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act," *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Feb., 1971.

Arndt, H.W. "Economic Development: A Semantic History," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol, 29, No. 3, Apr. 1981.

Asiwaju, A.I. "Ashby Revisited: A Review of Nigeria's Educational Growth, 1961 1971," *African Studies Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Apr. 1972.

CIA World Factbook, Nigeria, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html

David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, Michael Latham, Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003

Hodge, Joseph Morgan. Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism, Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007.

Gordon J. Idang, "The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement," *African Studies Review,*

vol. 13, No. 2, Sep. 1970.

Michael E. Latham. The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.

Macekura, Stephen. "The Point Four Program and the Origins of International Development Policy." M.A. Thesis. University of Virginia, 2008.

McVety, Amanda Kay. Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

William F. S. Miles, Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

Rostow, W.W., The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Shepard, Robert B. Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: From Kennedy to Reagan Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991.

Smythe, Hugh H. and Smythe, Mabel M. The New Nigerian Elite. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960

Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Williams, Peter and Moyes, Adrian. "Not By Governments Alone: The Role of British Non-Government Organisations in the Development Decade," London: Overseas Development Institute, 1964.